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作者 李奧尼翰森(Leonie Haimson)
從布宜諾斯艾利斯到波昂以及未來展望
1998年11月在阿根廷首都布宜諾斯艾利斯召開的氣候變化綱要公約締約國第四屆大會，其目標相當平實，就是希望針對京都議定書主要議題，包括排放交易、遵行承諾、碳匯(carbon sinks)及清潔發展機制(CDM)等，協商規範並達成共識。該次會議最後確定公元2000年11月為確定這些規範的最後期限。
此外，阿根廷及哈薩克宣佈自願承諾減少溫室氣體排放量，其著眼點在於加入國際間排放交易系統後潛在的環境及財政上的益處，或許他們的經濟會因國外增加對其乾淨能源的投資而獲利。
然而，這些進步的做法卻受到一些有力的開發中國家反對。他們認為工業國家有道德義務，應該先從自己國家減少排放量做起，而不是忙著進行國際間的排放交易，將限制加諸在開發中國家。有些國家質疑美國只是掩飾其對柏林命令(Berlin Mandate)執行不力，因為到目前為止，美國在溫室氣體排放限制方面幾無進展。
就在布宜諾斯艾利斯會議進行的第二週，美國宣佈簽署京都議定書(Kyoto Protocol)。但是，除非有更多開發中國家同意限制排放，現階段美國參議院不太可能批准這項議定書。他們所持的理由是，這會抑制美國經濟，並導致能源密集的工業出走到國外。
在布宜諾斯艾利斯會議的最後一天晚上，包括中國、印度、沙烏地阿拉伯、科威特、委內瑞拉及奈及利亞在內的開發中國家組成了一個否決集團，並於早上三點退出談判。他們在會場外遇見一群最易受氣候變遷造成海平面上升而蒙受巨大損失的小島國家代表，以及來自阿根廷及其他一些開發中國家的代表。後二群代表意識到整個氣候變遷協商已瀕臨破裂，於是威脅否決集團回到談判桌上，否則將取而代之。會議因此得以繼續進行，並確立公元2000年11月為訂立排放交易規範的最後期限。
締約國第五屆大會重新啟動
氣候變化綱要公約締約國第五屆大會於1999年10月25日至11月5日在波昂召開。雖然沒有受到太多媒體的關注，但從政府官員到環保團體成員，許多與會者都感受到一股更新動力及重振目標嚴肅性的氣氛。氣候變化綱要公約執行秘書Michael Zammit-Cutajar說：「就如預期，這次會議雖然沒有突破性的進展，但是氣氛卻非常積極正面」。
德國總理Gerhard Schroeder在開幕時戲劇性地要求已開發國家在2002年前批准京都議定書(Kyoto Protocol)，使會議一開始就進入最高潮。直到目前，只有十四個國家批准議定書，這十四個國家主要都是小島國，而紐西蘭可望在今年年底批准。許多國家現在要求要達到「Rio+10」的目標，也就是在里約熱內盧地球高峰會十週年紀念，即公元2002年以前開始執行公約。
歐盟(European Union)和日本對這個期限的回應是「準備好了且樂意」遵守，而加拿大與美國則希望儘早實行公約。但是柯林頓政府一直對訂下批准議定書的確實日期猶豫不決，尤其在數週前參議院才剛否決了全面停止核子試爆協定(Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty)之後更是謹慎。
與會者也注意到美國及其盟國，歐盟及開發中國家三方面態度都較為軟化，美國不再要求將締約國第六屆大會延至2000年11月大選之後，歐盟不再堅持限制排放交易的程度以符合京都協議，甚至連開發中國家都開始表現得好像會更認真考慮同意未來限制他們的溫室氣體排放。
這項新的且具有建設性的變動，或許有部分原因是這些團體內部分級的結果。歐盟中有些國家，最明顯的就是荷蘭，促成限制較少的排放交易制度。
在開發中國家的G77當中，拉丁美洲國家似乎了解到認同排放限制協議是有好處的，會帶來額外的資金，且當排放交易市場建立之後，對於他們經濟的投資也將增加。
另一個讓開發中國家意見分歧的議題就是「負面的影響」，氣候變化綱要公約要求考量氣候變遷或執行氣候變遷相關措施時對開發中國家的負面影響。這部分的公約，包括實際上補償措施，倍受爭議，因為這對於小島國不利，他們可能因海平面上升而損失許多土地，相對於石油輸出組織(OPEC)，各國則害怕在控制氣候變遷方面的努力，會使得他們的石油收入減少。總而言之，在第五屆大會當中，開發中國家似乎已逐漸準備好要擺脫石油輸出組織各國，因為他們似乎不放過任何機會致力於阻礙公約的進展。
下一個且更困難的期限將會是2000年6月在荷蘭海牙舉行的第六屆大會。在這次會議中，公約內容將觸及所有主要的困難議題，包括允許多少的排放量交易，如何計算像是森林之類的碳匯，如何強制執行等。只要這三個議題有任何一個沒有解決，主要的參與者如美國將可能不履行承諾，削減排放量。認清此一事實，與會者同意在未來數個月中進行一系列的臨時討論會，以便敲定各項分別關於交易、匯及承諾等各項議題的細節。
其他關於協商資訊的連結
Leonie Haimson曾是以前Liberty Tree Alliance網站的專欄作家，Debunking Rush Limbaugh on the Environment for the Environmental Defense 基金會出版的The Way Things Really Are作者之一，並且幫聯合國環境規劃署編訂Common Questions on Climate Change一書。
原文詳見:http://www.gristmagazine.com/grist/
heatbeat/negotiationsb.stm
版權歸屬 Earth Day Network，環境信託協會 (陳均輝 譯，李玲玲審校)
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From Buenos Aires to Bonn and Beyond
In November 1998, COP-4 convened in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The goal was modest: to agree upon a plan to negotiate rules for key elements of the Kyoto Protocol, including emissions trading, compliance, carbon sinks, and the CDM. By the end of the meeting, negotiators did manage to set a deadline of November 2000 for deciding on these rules.
In addition, the nations of Argentina and Kazakhstan announced their intention to adopt voluntary commitments to limit their emissions, seeing potential environmental and financial advantages in opting into an international emissions trading system, whereby their economies might benefit from increased foreign investment in clean energy.
Nevertheless, these steps forward were opposed by some powerful members of the developing country bloc, which consider it the moral duty of industrialized nations to begin by reducing their emissions at home rather than engaging in international emissions trading and pushing for limits on developing countries. Some would argue that the U.S. has only lent ammunition to that view by failing to live up to the Berlin Mandate, having done little to restrict greenhouse gas emissions so far.
During the second week of the Buenos Aires conference, the U.S. announced its signature to the Kyoto Protocol. Yet the current U.S. Senate is unlikely to ratify the treaty until more developing countries agree to binding restrictions, on the ostensible grounds that the agreement would stifle the U.S. economy and lead to the flight of many energy-intensive industries abroad
On the last night of the meeting in Buenos Aires, a group of developing countries -- China, India, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Venezuela, and Nigeria -- formed a rejectionist bloc and walked out of the negotiations at 3:00 a.m. They were met outside the door by delegates from the small island states, which have the most to lose from rising sea levels caused by climate change, as well as members from Argentina and a few other developing nations which recognized that the entire framework of the climate treaty was in danger of collapsing. These delegates forced the rejectionists back inside by threatening to take their place at the bargaining table. Thus negotiations continued, and the November 2000 deadline to establish rules for emissions trading was set.
Renewed Momentum at COP-5
COP-5 met from October 25 to November 5, 1999, in Bonn. Though there were few actual headlines, many of the participants, from government officials to members of environmental groups, felt a renewed momentum in the air and a revived seriousness of purpose. "As expected, this wasn't the time for breakthroughs, but above all there was a very positive mood in the ministerial meetings," said Michael Zammit-Cutajar, executive secretary of the
UNFCCC.
Probably the biggest splash occurred right away, when German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder opened the conference with a dramatic challenge to the developed nations to ratify the Kyoto Protocol by 2002. Up till now, only 14 countries, primarily small island nations, have done so -- though New Zealand is expected to ratify the treaty later this year. Many are now calling for a goal of "Rio+10," which would bring the treaty into force by 2002, the 10th anniversary of the Earth Summit in Rio.
The European Union responded that it was "ready and willing" to meet this deadline, as did Japan, while Canada and the U.S. called for the treaty to enter into force "at the earliest possible date." The Clinton administration, already hesitant to set a firm date for ratification, was especially cautious because of the Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty just weeks before.
Some participants also noted an apparent easing of the three-way gridlock between the U.S. and its allies, the European Union, and the developing countries. The U.S. stopped demanding that COP-6 be put off until after its November 2000 elections. The EU was less insistent about limiting the extent to which emissions trading can be used to meet Kyoto commitments. Even the developing countries began to act as though they might more seriously consider agreeing to limitations on their greenhouse gas emissions in the future.
Part of this new constructive dynamic may also have been a result of divisions in the internal ranks of each of these groups. Within the EU, several countries, most notably the Netherlands, are pushing for a less restrictive emissions trading regime.
Within the G77 group, which includes the developing nations, the Latin American countries seemed to realize that agreeing to emissions limitations may work to their advantage, by bringing in additional revenue and increased investment to their economies as an active market in emissions trading is established.
Another contentious issue that divides the developing nations is the question of "adverse effects." The UNFCCC calls for consideration of negative impacts on developing countries arising either from climate change or from the implementation of measures to address climate change. This section of the treaty, which involves the possibility of actual reparations, has been controversial because it pits the small island states, which may lose much of their land area to rising sea levels, against the OPEC countries, which fear losing oil revenues as a result of efforts to control climate change. As a whole, at COP-5, the developing nations seemed increasingly ready to break away from the OPEC countries, which appear to work at every opportunity to block progress on the treaty.
The next and more difficult deadline will be COP-6, to be held in The Hague, Netherlands, in the fall of 2000. At this meeting, agreement has to be reached on a whole host of difficult issues, including how much trading in emission allowances will be permitted, how carbon sinks such as forests will be counted, and how compliance will be enforced. If any of these three issues is not resolved, major players like the U.S. may simply not make a concerted effort to cut their emissions. In recognition of this fact, negotiators agreed on a new set of interim workshops to hammer out the details separately on each of these issues -- trading, sinks, and compliance -- to be held several times over the course of the coming months.
Links to More Negotiation Information
- All of the official U.N. negotiating documents are on file at the website of the Climate Change Secretariat, as well as a timetable of future negotiations and international meetings.
http://www.unfccc.de/
- The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) offers summaries of its reports on its website.
http://www.ipcc.ch/
- The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has extensive information about climate change and the climate treaty.
http://www.unep.ch/iuc/
- The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), publishers of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, maintains a valuable website called Linkages, with daily reports from the climate negotiations and connections to a other related
material.
http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/climate/
- For an entertaining glimpse of what is happening while the negotiating sessions are taking place, be sure to check out the irreverent ECO, the newsletter of the international Climate Action Network, published daily during major meetings of the climate
negotiations.
http://www.igc.apc.org/climate/Eco.html
Leonie Haimson was the climate columnist for the former Liberty Tree Alliance website. She co-authored The Way Things Really Are: Debunking Rush Limbaugh on the Environment for the Environmental Defense Fund, and edited Common Questions on Climate Change for the U.N. Environment Program. |
