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¡@¡@Chris Neme:¬ü°ê¦ò»X¯S¦{¦ÊÆF¹y¥«¦ò »X¯S¯à·½§ë¸ê¤½¥q
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¤¤^¹ï·Ó¥þ¤å¡Ghttp://e-info.org.tw/issue/water/2001/issue-water-irn01071601.htm
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In the past decade, nongovernmental groups in North America have witnessed a leveling of the energy-planning playing field as they press utilities to use demand management programmes as alternatives to new power plants. Environmental groups in parts of the US and Canada have been given access to funds to hire expert consultants to perform extensive, in-depth analysis of demand management potential. The result is that regulators, legislators and sometimes even the utilities themselves accept the work as credible and compelling enough to force changes in the way utilities operate. Where did these NG0s get the money for this research') The surprising answer: from the utilities themselves.
Why would the utilities give NGOs money that would only be used to oppose their plans'? First, in some jurisdictions, they have no choice. Some government regulators have developed policies recognizing that NGOs represent legitimate public interests and establishing funding mechanisms that permit NGOs to intervene in regulatory proceedings over utility plans. For example, the Ontario Energy Board, which regulates all of the electric and natural gas utilities in Canada's largest province, requires utilities to reimburse NGOs for all legal and analytical costs incurred in challenging the utilities' plans if it determines that the NGOs provided constructive input into the regulatory process. This allows the NGOs to hire the lawyers, demand management experts and other consultants necessary to analyze and critique the usually voluminous studies utilities develop to support their positions. Although NGOs still tend to face uphill battles in most cases, they often win at least some concessions from regulators and utilities and occasionally have substantial victories (as when the Ontario Energy Board rejected Unit inadequate; more aggressive plan.
In addition, in some places, NGOs have succeeded in convincing utility managers that they would be better off negotiating settlements on demand management and power plant investments than entering protracted and costly legal battles. Negotiated settlements in the late l980s set the stage for aggressive approaches to demand management in California, Massachusetts and a number of other states by advancing new regulatory proposals which enable utilities to make more money from successful efficiency investments than from building new power plants.
Since then, NGOs have continued to negotiate with utilities in for a commonly known as "collaboratives." Under collaboratives, utilities will provide substantial financial resources to NGOs (often hundreds of thousands of dollars a year for a single utility) so that the NGOs can hire their own demand management experts for advice in negotiations with the utilities. Although the utilities are providing the money, the demand management experts are answerable only to the NGOs. In many cases, the experts have successfully won the respect and trust of utility officials over time, to the point that some utilities have accepted and implemented the demand management programmes the NGO's experts have recommended. Although they are far from universal, such "collaborative" arrangements remain common in several parts of the United States, particularly the northeastern states. As a result, there is a small but effective industry of demand management experts who work primarily for public-interest advocates.
Chris Neme, Vermont Energy Investment Corporation, Burlington, VT/USA
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