|
世界銀行是全世界的大型水壩建設最主要的經濟來源。在其既定目標 -減輕貧窮 - 的驅動之下，它所支持與投資的水壩建設已使得上千萬的人民被迫離開家園、造成嚴重的環境危機，並使原本已負債的國家背負更多的債務。世界銀行從不遲疑地對其所資助的貸款國索償(甚至是對那些失敗的計畫)，卻從來不曾為那些被迫遠離家園的數百萬人民與環境所造成的傷害付出代價。
一項由全世界水壩受害社群所組成的新興運動正因此而要求索賠，或爭取在法律追溯期內的補償，因為那些已完工的水壩對人們與環境造成持續性的傷害。從瓜地馬拉(Guatemala)馬雅阿契(Maya Achi)的原住民，到泰國(Thailand) 被帕克穆水壩(Pak Mun Dam)影響的人們，這些人向世界銀行要求公義。該是世界銀行償還其自身債務的時候了。
世界銀行＝建水壩銀行 (回目錄)
世界銀行貸款史上的 「註冊商標」就是建大型水壩。無論是用作水力發電、防洪或灌溉，大型水壩都是大規模公共工程發展的主題。世銀提供超過六百億美元(1993年記錄)給 92個國家來興建538座水壩，這其中還包括數個世界上最大、也最受爭議的計劃。
世界銀行的 「大型水壩建設成果精選集 」讀起來就像是一本教人如何不顧一切阻斷水流的指南。一而再，再而三的事實證明，水壩所帶來的利益遠不及當初所承諾的。然而依據其所花費的金錢來計算 : 傷害遠比想像的還要嚴重 : 包括召來負債、社群被強制驅離、漁場與森林被破壞、與喪失機會。雖然世界銀行宣稱其操作模式已在近年來獲得改善，但如同雷索托高地水資源計畫(the Lesotho Highlands Water Project)、中國的二灘水壩(Ertan Dam)、寮國(Laos)的南屯二號水壩(Nam Theun 2 dam)計畫卻揭露了持續發生的社會、環境與經濟問題。
世界銀行是製造窮人專家
(回目錄)
世銀所投資的大型水壩已使上千萬的男人、婦女與孩童成為流浪在故鄉的難民，包括在中國有十萬八千人因小浪底水壩而被驅離、在印尼有二萬四千位村民因克丹翁波水壩(Kedung Ombo Dam)造成村後水位上升而緊抓住他們的屋頂、在迦納(Ghana)的佛塔河(Volta River)河谷有八萬名農人因其家園受阿克松波水壩(Akosombo Dam)的影響而受害。在絕大多數的案例中，這些受水壩驅逐而失根的人們在經濟、文化與情緒上都受到極大的傷害。在許多情況之下，曾經自給自足的農業家庭都淪落成流動工人或貧民窟的居民，只能勉強地維持生計。
僅管策略上要求必須使這些被迫驅離的人至少能回歸其過往的生活水準，世界銀行在計畫報告書中引用了少數案例，然而這些僅僅發生在一小部份被逐者，大部分的人都無法維持以前的生活水準。在1994年「河壩居民再置/遷村回顧報告 (Bankwide Resettlement Review)」中只發現一座水壩和其他數百座世界銀行所投資水壩的不同- 那就是泰國的高廉水壩 (Khao Laerm) ，報告指出所有的居民們在遷村之後，均提高了家庭收入。然而透過訪談，卻有五分之四的家庭認為他們比在再遷村之前的處境還要艱難。
由於不適當、或根本不存在的遷村計畫，世界銀行所投資興建的絕大多數水壩完全沒有關於被驅離民眾在遷村前後的收入資料。官方估計的被驅離人口數字明顯偏低。即使有關於被水壩貯水池確實驅離的估計人口的出現，那些因水壩相關灌溉溝渠、管線與其他公共工程而被驅逐的人和原本當地的非法居民，卻時常被排除在總遷村人口數之外。例如，在印度沙達沙洛伐水壩(Sardar Sarovar Dam)的 1985年評鑑之中，總共忽略了十四萬名因為此計畫所建造的大量河道網和溝渠而喪失土地的農人。
印度作者阿倫哈蒂羅伊 (Arundhati Roy) 在寫到印度的遷村實況時，指出「這數百萬流離失所的人民再也不會存在了。歷史中不會有他們，人口調查記錄中也找不到他們。他們之中有些人後來被驅離了三四次…一旦他們開始流動，就永遠不會有安頓之所。大多數人最終被吸納到大城市周邊的貧民窟，這地方融合成一個廉價勞力結構的巨大匯聚地... 」
再者，因為漁貨量的損失、水文改變削減季節性沖積平原的農產、或其他在造壩之前既有利益的消失，住在水壩下游的人們時常被迫棄守他們的房子。例如，馬利(Mali)的馬拿達利水壩(Manantali Dam)只讓一萬一千人遷村，但有五十萬住在下游的農民卻承受經常性的西納加河(Senegal River)流域改道之苦。
世界銀行破壞環境 (回目錄)
世界銀行投資的水壩要為淹沒數萬平方公里的森林、屠殺無數漁產、開放邊陲地區資源榨取、沖積平原、濕地與入海口棲地的消失負責。土科瑞(Tucurui)與巴比那水壩 (Balbina Dams)共淹沒巴西六千四百平方公里的亞馬遜雨林。阿科松波(Akosombo)淹沒了比世界上任何其他水壩都還多的土地，共有8500平方公里，約是迦納百分之四的國土。世銀所資助的水壩和灌溉系統也導致水源感染病的大流行，特別是血吸蟲病和瘧疾的爆發。
由世界銀行在1991年所投資興建的136MW派克穆水壩(136 MW Pak Mun Dam)，由於其位置就在穆河(Mun River)的河口處，於是阻礙了整個穆河流域 - 泰國東北最重要的流域 - 的魚類迴游。這項計畫也導致多個急流變緩流，對魚類繁殖造成重要影響。至少有169種魚類不再出現於水壩上游，而漁貨量則較造壩之前減少了60%到80%，影響了數千名以漁業為生的人。
世界銀行所支持的計畫甚至在投資或興建之前就造成環境破壞。以寮國南屯二號水壩為例，這個被世界銀行視為受政治力量擔保並在其他方面受到協助的水壩在尚未興建前，在生物資源上相當重要的那凱高原 (Nakai Plateau)就有一百萬立方公尺的木材被砍伐，以清出土地做為蓄水區之用。世界銀行現在卻以社會與環境利益為由，為其計畫做自我辯護，聲稱那凱高原情況太糟已不值得保護，並聲稱應造壩來提供財源，以保護此流域。
世界銀行造成經濟夢魘 (回目錄)
世銀造壩計畫在經濟與技術層面上也表現不佳。一項1996年世銀的研究調查發現，從1960年代起，世銀投資興建的70座水力發電水壩平均花費超過既定的30%。另一項世銀的研究發現，完成於1970與1980年代的80個水壩計畫中，有四分之三超出預算。幾乎有三分之一已被研究的計畫，花費的金錢超過原本估計的 50% ，甚至更多。
在瓜地馬拉的奇克索水壩 (Chixoy Dam)建造期間，隧道設計不良而造成的崩塌使得工程延誤了九年，並超支了250%。1990年該國因水壩缺水，無法供水供電，而造成一系列的經濟癱瘓。兩年後，又因雨量太少而導致一個多月的電力供應不足，該國一天之中在工業生產上損失了二百萬元。奇克索水壩的總造價高達美金十二億元，比原估計的五倍還多 - 相當於瓜地馬拉1988年總外債的近40%。
世銀對電力需求的估算誇張得無法形容，使其在運轉時產生過多的產能。造價三十四億美元的中國二灘水壩(Ertan Dam) 獲得美金十二億元，是世銀所有計畫中最高的經濟支援。近期報導指出，此水壩從1998年8月開始生產電力之後，因電力供過於求，一天之中就損失美金二百四十萬元。由於此計畫的高成本與對中國電力工業的改變，二灘水壩的電力比當地從1991年開始營運的小型電廠貴出許多，使它的電力一點也不吸引消費者。
貪污和世銀水壩工程脫不了關係。在奇克索計畫的興建期間，有三億五千萬到五億元花用在賄賂官員上。阿根廷(Argentina)和巴拉圭 (Paraguay)之間的帕拉那河(Parana River) 雅西瑞塔水壩(Yacyreta Dam)，因其花費由最初估算的十六億元膨漲到八十億元，而被視為「貪污紀念碑」。最近爆發的賴索托(Lesotho) 高地水資源計畫 (Highlands Water Projects) 其執行長與世界上十二家最大的造壩公司之行賄醜聞， 並不是世銀造壩計畫中的特例，所特別的是其惡行居然被發現了。
「我們不要搬家」 (回目錄)
世銀的水壩借貸案在1970年代末期與1980年代初期達到高峰，達到一年投資超過二十億元美元(1993年記錄)。從1990年代中期起，世銀在大壩上的借貸已大幅減少。從1995-1999年，世銀及其私人部門國際金融公會(International Finance Corporation)共投資14項水壩相關貸款二十三億元。目前在投資興建中的還有五個 : 兩個位於中國的大壩計畫、尼泊爾一項提升水力發電發展的能源部門貸款、烏干達的布呼嘎利瀑布水壩 (Nujugali Fall Falls Dam)與寮國南屯二號水壩的政治擔保與IFC貸款。其中的三個出現在中國與寮國並不令人意外，因為在這些國家，政府還不能忍受抗議活動。
世銀降低投資的主因是全世界反水壩運動的努力。世銀在1993年被迫取消印度的拿馬達水壩(Narmada Dam)計畫，這是一個反水壩運動的里程碑。沙達沙洛瓦(Sardar Sarovar) 計畫是大規模運動的催化劑， 受害村民、印度草根運動者、和國際性的團體開始質疑世銀的大壩投資計畫。另一次的改變發生於1995年，當時世銀受民眾運動強迫，進而取消了尼泊爾的阿倫三號壩(Arun III Dam)。從那時開始，世銀就較少投資水壩計畫。
世銀降低大壩貸款是反水壩運動的一次勝利。但已受世銀大壩影響的社群卻沒有什麼是值得慶祝的，而那些在銀行未來計畫中可能受害的生命也是一樣。在1994年，44個國家中的2154個組織簽署馬尼貝利宣言 (Manibeli Declaration)，要求世銀延長大壩貸款的法定償付期限，並對受害民眾進行補償。這項要求在1997年於巴西(Brazil)克利提巴(Curitiba) ，由水壩受害民眾所組成的國際會議中重新再被提出。
(回目錄)
原文詳見 : http://www.irn.org/programs/
finance/damfacts.html
版權歸屬 International River Network，環境信託協會 (謝洵怡 譯，陳維立 審校)
中英對照全文詳見：http://news.ngo.org.tw/issue/
water/issue-water-irn00052901.htm
(回目錄)
|
|
The World Bank has been the largest single source of funds for large dam construction worldwide. Under its stated aim of alleviating poverty, it has promoted and funded dams that have displaced more than 10 million people from their homes and land, caused severe environmental damage, and pushed borrowers further into debt. Never hesitant to exact loan repayment in perpetuity for projects it has funded (even failed projects), the World Bank has never been forced to pay for the destruction it has caused to millions of people's lives and the environment.
A growing movement of dam-affected communities from all over the world is demanding reparations, or retroactive compensation, for the continuing damage to their lives because of dams which have already been completed. From the Maya Achi indigenous people in Guatemala to the people affected by Pak Mun Dam in Thailand, people are demanding justice from the World Bank. It's time for the Bank to pay its own debts.
The Dam-Builder's Bank
Large dams, whether built for hydropower, flood control, or irrigation, epitomize the huge infrastructure development projects which have been the staple of World Bank lending throughout its history. The Bank has provided more than $60 billion (in 1993 dollars) for 538 large dams in 92 countries, including many of the world's largest and most controversial projects.
The Bank's portfolio of large dams reads like a primer on the folly of damming rivers. In case after case the benefits have been far smaller than promised, and the costs - in terms of money spent, debts incurred, communities uprooted, fisheries and forests destroyed, and opportunities lost - have been far greater than imagined. While the Bank claims that its operations have improved in recent years, projects such as the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, the Ertan Dam in China and the proposed Nam Theun 2 dam in Laos reveal ongoing social, environmental and economic problems with its large dam portfolio.
The Business of Poverty Creation
Bank-funded large dams have turned more than ten million men, women and children into refugees in their own land, including 180,000 people displaced by the Xiaolangdi dam in China, 24,000 Indonesian villagers, some of whom clung to their rooftops as the waters rose behind Kedung Ombo Dam, and the 80,000 farmers of the Volta River valley in Ghana, forced from their homes by the Akosombo Dam. These legions of dam oustees have, in the great majority of cases, been economically, culturally and emotionally devastated. In many cases once self-sufficient farming families have been reduced to eking out a living as migrant laborers or slum dwellers.
Despite a policy requiring that those displaced are enabled to at least regain their former living standards, World Bank reviews cite few instances where this has occurred to even a small proportion of oustees. A 1994 Bankwide Resettlement Review found only one dam - Khao Laem in Thailand - out of the many hundreds the Bank has funded, where incomes for all households rose after resettlement. Yet when interviewed, four-fifths of the households considered themselves to be worse off than before resettlement.
For the vast majority of dams it has funded, the Bank simply has no data on the incomes or living standards of displaced people, before or after resettlement, due to inadequate or non-existent resettlement plans. Official estimates of the number of oustees have been notoriously low. Even when a realistic estimate is made of the people displaced by a reservoir, those evicted to make way for dam-related irrigation canals, transmission lines and other infrastructure, as well as people without land title, are often excluded from the total. The 1985 appraisal of the Sardar Sarovar Dam in India, for example, totally overlooked 140,000 farmers who are estimated to lose at least some of their land to the project's massive network of canals.
Indian author Arundhati Roy, writing about resettlement in India, states "The millions of displaced people don't exist anymore. When history is written they won't be in it. Not even as statistics. Some of them have subsequently been displaced three and four times... Once they start rolling, there's no resting place. The great majority is eventually absorbed into slums on the periphery of our great cities, where it coalesces into an immense pool of cheap construction
labour..."
In addition, people who live downstream of the dam are often forced to abandon their homes because of loss of fisheries, changes to hydrology which eliminate seasonal floodplain agriculture, or of other benefits previously provided by the undammed river. For example, 11,000 people were flooded out by the Manantali Dam in Mali, but half a million farmers downstream are suffering the consequences of the changed flow regime of the Senegal River.
Environmental Destruction
World Bank-funded dams are responsible for the submergence of tens of thousands of square kilometers of forests, the decimation of countless fisheries, the opening of remote areas for resource extraction, and the loss of floodplain, wetland and estuarine habitat. Tucurui and Balbina Dams together drowned 6,400 square kilometers of rainforest in the Brazilian Amazon. Akosombo flooded more land than any other dam in the world, 8,500 square kilometers, around four percent of the area of Ghana. Bank-funded dams and irrigation schemes have also led to explosions in the incidence of waterborne diseases, especially schistosomiasis and malaria.
Because of its location at the mouth of the Mun River, the 136 MW Pak Mun Dam, funded by the World Bank in 1991, blocks fish migration for the entire Mun-Chi river system, the most important in Thailand's northeast. The project also led to the submergence of rapids important for fish breeding. As a result, 169 fish species are no longer found upstream of the dam, and fish catches have decreased by 60 to 80% from pre-dam levels, affecting many thousands of people who depended on fisheries for their livelihood.
World Bank support for a project may cause environmental destruction even before the project is funded or built. In the case of the proposed Nam Theun 2 Dam in Laos, for which the World Bank is considering a political risk guarantee and other assistance, more than one million cubic meters of timber on the biologically significant Nakai Plateau has been logged to clear the reservoir area even though the dam may never be built. The World Bank now justifies its support for the project on the basis of purported social and environmental benefits, claiming that the Nakai Plateau is so degraded that it is not worth saving, and that the dam should be built to provide revenue to protect the watershed area.
Economic Nightmares
World Bank dam projects have also performed poorly in economic and technical terms. A 1996 World Bank investigation found that construction cost overruns averaged 30 percent on 70 hydropower dams funded by the Bank since the 1960s. Another World Bank study reveals that, of 80 hydro projects completed in the 1970s and 1980s, three-quarters had costs in excess of budget. On almost one-third of the projects studied, costs exceeded estimates by 50 percent or more.
The collapse of poorly designed tunnels during the construction of Guatemala's Chixoy Dam contributed to a nine-year delay and cost overruns of 250 percent. In 1990 the country suffered a series of blackouts because of a lack of water at the dam. Two years later, another power shortage because of low rainfall resulted in electricity rationing for more than a month, costing the country $2 million a day in lost industrial production. The final cost of Chixoy - $1.2 billion, more than five times the original estimate - represented nearly 40 per cent of Guatemala's total external debt in 1988.
World Bank power demand estimates are invariably exaggerated, resulting in excess generating capacity when the project comes on line. The $3.4 billion Ertan Dam in China garnered the World Bank's largest-ever project financing package of $1.2 billion. Recent reports have revealed that project has been losing more than $2.4 million a day since it first started producing power in August 1998 due to lack of demand. Due to the project's high costs and changes in China's power industry, Ertan's electricity is significantly more expensive than that produced by smaller power stations which have sprung up since ground was first broken for Ertan in 1991, making its power unattractive for consumers.
Corruption has been a stalwart of World Bank-funded dams. Between $350 and $500 million dollars were lost to corruption during the implementation of the Chixoy project. The Yacyreta dam on the Parana River, between Argentina and Paraguay, became known as a "monument to corruption" as the cost of the project ballooned from an original estimate of $1.6 billion to more than $8 billion. The recent corruption scandal involving the Chief Executive of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project and 12 of the biggest dam-building companies in the world is not unusual in a World Bank-funded dam project. What is unusual is that they were caught.
"We Shall Not Be Moved"
World Bank lending for dams peaked in the late 1970s and early 1980s at a level of more than $2 billion a year (1993 dollars). Since the mid-1990s the World Bank's lending for large dams has declined significantly. From 1995-1999, the World Bank and its private sector International Finance Corporation made 14 dam-related loans amounting to $2.3 billion. In the pipeline are five more: two projects involving large dams in China, an energy sector loan promoting hydropower development in Nepal, and political risk guarantees and IFC loans for Bujugali Falls Dam in Uganda and Nam Theun 2 Dam in Laos.
It is no accident that three of these projects are in China and Laos, countries where opposition movements are not tolerated by the government.
A major reason for decline in Bank funding has been the struggle by anti-dam movements across the world. A milestone was reached when the World Bank was forced to pull out of the Narmada Dam project in India in 1993. The Sardar Sarovar project became the catalyst for a huge movement of affected villagers, Indian grassroots activists and international groups questioning the World Bank's involvement in large dam projects. Another watershed came in 1995, when the World Bank was forced by citizen action to withdraw from the Arun III Dam in Nepal. Since this time, the Bank has funded less dams than ever before.
The Bank's decline in lending for large dams is a partial victory for the anti-dam movement. But the communities who have been affected by Bank-funded dams have nothing to celebrate. Neither do those whose lives will be destroyed by future Bank projects. In 1994, 2154 organizations in 44 countries signed the Manibeli Declaration, calling for a moratorium on Bank lending for large dams and for the Bank to pay reparations to dam-affected peoples. This call was renewed at the first international meeting of dam-affected people in Curitiba, Brazil, in 1997. |
