台灣的環保問題與環保運動(中) | 環境資訊中心
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台灣的環保問題與環保運動(中)

Taiwan's environmental protection problems and movement Ⅱ

2006年11月02日
編輯:李美儀;英文翻譯:馬強

礦業與工業

Mining and industry

另一個是採礦,尤其是水泥礦的開採。本來都在西部開採,後來李登輝有一個產業東移的政策,但是其實產業並沒有真正東移,只有採礦東移,就在太魯閣國家公園的外圍開採。水泥礦對台灣自然資源的破壞力非常大。台灣的水泥人均用量全世界排名第二,僅次於科威特,一年用掉約一千兩百多公噸的水泥,而且還有一些可以外銷。

Another problem is mining, especially for minerals to make cement. In the beginning, it was only the western part of Taiwan that was heavily mined for these minerals, but former President Lee Teng-hui advocated a new policy encouraging industry to move to the eastern part of the island. What ended up happening was that the mining industry moved east while the others pretty much stayed put, with mining interests excavating on the periphery of Taroko National Park. The extraction of these minerals has taken a heavy toll on Taiwan’s natural resources. Taiwan is the number two country in the world in terms of the volume of concrete use, second behind only Kuwait. Taiwan uses approximately 1,200 metric tons of concrete per person per year annually and has some left over for export.

另外一個問題是工業,高雄是台灣最早發展石化工業的地方,從1968年開始蓋了第一座輕油裂解廠,到今天一共蓋了五座。剛開始就造成這樣非常嚴重的空氣污染,嚴重到在家裡點蚊香、點一根菸都會爆炸,地下水點火會燃燒的地步。所以在1987年政府要建第五座輕油裂解廠時,引發當地居民非常強烈的抗爭,包括到立法院抗議,甚至把工廠整個圍了幾百天不准它開工,最後是政府帶鎮暴警察鎮壓之後才結束。可是這樣的抗爭並不是完全沒有效果,最後還是逼得政府不得不做它將在民國104年(2015年)遷廠的決定。現在台灣正面臨石化工業跟鋼鐵業要重新建廠的關鍵時代,很多地方都在發動一些反對新工廠建立的計劃,像雲林就在反對台塑大煉鋼廠的建廠計劃;王永慶為什麼在兩岸這麼吃得開,因為他一天到晚要脅政府說,如果你不給我一些優惠獎勵,我就要到對岸去。台塑在台灣的環保紀錄很差,但是他就是利用兩邊拉鋸戰,兩邊游走,爭取它最大利益空間。

There is also the problem of industry. Taiwan’s petrochemical industry began its development in Kaohsiung. The first naphtha cracker plant was built there in 1968 and there are a total of five in the region today. In the beginning, these plants caused severe air pollution to the point that lighting a mosquito coil or cigarette at home would cause an explosion and any spark in the underground water supply would bring about problems as well. When the government proposed building the fifth naphtha cracker plant in 1987, local residents vehemently protested. Demonstrators marched on the Legislative Yuan and surrounded the proposed plant site for hundreds of days in order to keep construction from proceeding. The protest ended when the government sent in anti-riot police. The protests, however, were not completely in vain, as they forced the government to decide to move the factory by the year 2015. Today Taiwan faces a crucial period as the petrochemical and steel industries look to set up more factories. Many places are starting campaigns against the establishment of factories in their areas. People in Yunlin County are against Formosa Plastics building a steel mill there. Formosa Plastics Chairman Wang Yung-ching still gets a lot of mileage out of playing Taiwan and China against each other though, threatening each side to take his business to the other unless he is given preferential economic incentives. The environmental protection record for Formosa Plastics in Taiwan leaves much to be desired, but he uses the political tug-of-war going on between Taiwan and China to his advantage.

另外一個是高科技產業。台灣有三大產業,金屬煉鋼、石化與電子電機,這三大產業大概佔台灣九成以上。竹科大概是二十五年前開始發展起來,很多人以為竹科的電子產業不同於煉鋼、石化,不會造成嚴重的污染,但事實上它也有很嚴重的問題。第一,它要犧牲非常大面積的農地,大的面板用的土地面積,一個廠大概都要五十公頃到一百公頃,台灣僅存大面積的台糖的土地,會一筆一筆的消失。面板廠所造成的污染也包括處理廢棄物導致的地下水汙染問題。這些廢水倒到河川裡以後,農田引水灌溉,農田就漸漸鹽化,沒辦法再耕種,地下水的污染也造成沿海生態的破壞,衍伸出很多食品安全的問題,譬如那裡養出來的牡蠣重金屬含量很高。

There are three major industries in Taiwan, steel, petrochemical and electronic. These three industries account for over 90 percent of the total here. The Hsinchu Science Park began developing 25 years ago. Many people believe that the electronics industry in the Hsinchu Science Park does not pollute as profusely as the petrochemical and steel industries do, but in fact there is still a very serious problem in this regard as well. First, the park is located on a massive plot of former farmland. One factory requires anywhere from 50 to 100 hectares. The problems these factories create include waste disposal management that lead to groundwater pollution. The wastewater then reaches the rivers, which farmers use for irrigation. The fields then gradually take in too much salt, rendering them incapable of further cultivation. Groundwater pollution also causes the destruction of ecosystems along coastal areas that in turn lead to problems with food safety. One example is the exorbitant amount of heavy metals found in cultivated oysters along the coast.

另外,這種工廠需要的水量非常巨大,農民跟這種大資本家競奪水源,結果都是農民輸,所以最後農民只好休耕,提供給這些電子廠去用水。休耕的經費按理講應該是由這些電子業去負責,可是最後還是由政府來買單,其實是納稅人出的錢。 最不公平的是,這些高科技產業每年繳的稅非常少,這個模式基本上中國也正在複製,就是各國爭相用非常優惠的條件,包括租稅減免、引進的機器也免稅….,到最後你會發現表面上這些科技產業投資非常大,可是政府能夠收到的稅金卻非常少,它可以造就的是一批所謂的高科技新貴,與一步步拉大的貧富差距。

Moreover, these factories need a huge volume of water; farmers compete with these industrial giants for water sources, with the farmers ending up the losers. Often times farmers have no recourse but to leave their land fallow in order to supply water to these electronic factories. The fallowing fees should by rights be picked up by these factories, but all too often the government ends up footing the bill, which means it comes out of taxpayer pockets. The most unjust part of this whole matter is the very minimal amount of taxes these high-tech factories pay each year. China is presently copying this model now, which is predicated on offering very attractive incentives, including low land taxes and tax exemptions for imported equipment. In the end, we find that while on the surface these high-tech factories invest a lot, the taxes the government takes in are minimal. High-tech companies say they are just starting out, but they gradually help widen the poverty gap.

台灣環保團體抗爭的形式大概不脫群眾集會、遊行、陳情、抗議、遊說等等,這種抗議行動要比較有效果,幾乎地點都要選在台北,因為台北是政經中心,我們南部人比較辛苦,每次做抗爭都要到台北去。陳情對話的話,我們試著要不分黨派。不過在台灣,有關環保的議題,國民黨是徹頭徹尾的開發派,即使他們身為在野黨,他們還是全力支持這樣的開發案;民進黨披著一個「綠色」的外衣,因為它是從群眾運動起家,結合環保運動等種種反對力量起來的,所以它表面上要維持一個綠色政黨的形象,但是骨子裡也是沒有理想、沒有原則,它會被大量的技術官僚牽著走。過去如果民進黨在野的時候還好,因為我們可以跟他們合作來對抗國民黨的絕對開發主義,現在變成民進黨執政以後,我們沒辦法找國民黨當盟友,我們試著努力跟他們接觸,但是找他們沒有效果。

The protest methods chosen by Taiwan environmental protection groups have included rallies, pleading our cases with officials, marches and even canvassing. In order for these protests to be effective, they have had to take place in Taipei, as the city is Taiwan’s political and economic center. This has been a hardship on those of us from southern Taiwan who have to make this journey every time we want to get our point across. When we plead our cases with officials, we try to do so across party lines. But in Taiwan when in comes to environmental issues, the KMT is still the party that favors all-out development. Even now in their capacity as opposition party, many KMT members still devote efforts to initiating development plans. The Democratic Progressive Party wears a “green cloak,” because it was a party that got its start from popular grassroots support. The DPP combined the efforts and spirit of the environmental protection movement and other protest groups in rising to power. Consequently, on the surface the party wants to portray a green image. In point of fact, however, the party lacks ideals and principles and is just being pulled along by the vast majority of technocrats. When the DPP was the opposition party, at least we could join forces with its members to protest the absolute development policies advocated by the KMT. But now that the DPP has become the ruling party, we have no allies, because even when we try to approach the KMT, our efforts end up with few results.

最近有一個例子就是興建湖山水庫的政策。我們在立法院遊說的過程中,225席總共遊說了73席的立委反對這個水庫的開發,其中大部份是民進黨的立委,反而是在野的國民黨在支持這個政策。所以從2000年到現在,社會運動工作的推動非常困難,我們找不到真正的反對黨。表面上看來,兩邊好像吵得很厲害,但事實上在一些重大的開發議題上,他們完全是站在一起的,相較之下,我們是很弱勢的。政府官員最後都會把責任推給「民意」,民選官員是靠選票的,環保團體有多少選票?所以目前在環保議題的公共政策上,還沒有一個能夠真正理性討論的空間。

One recent example has been the policy behind building the Hushan Reservoir. Seventy-three of the 225 legislators we canvassed were against the development of the reservoir, with most of those dissenting from the DPP and the majority of the KMT legislators supporting the plan. Since 2000, social movement work has been extremely tough going in Taiwan, because we have failed to find a true opposition party to work with. On the surface of things, the two sides look like they are constantly at each other’s throats, but when it comes to major development projects, they usually stand side by side. Our own power is weak compared with theirs. Government officials always push the final blame on “public will.” Government officials are popularly elected, but how many votes do environmental protection groups get? It seems that presently there is little room left for rational dialogue in Taiwan when it comes to public policy on environmental protection issues.

李根政:台灣大部分的開發案還是有「環境影響評估」,這個機制的建立大概有十幾年了,可是一直以來其實都是橡皮圖章,很多都可以被政府左右。2005年新的環保署署長(張國龍)上任之後,邀請了一些民間的環保團體的成員進入環評,可是還是有來自行政院方面的壓力,最後迫使環評方向轉向。在台灣,中央政府還是掌握大部分開發案的主導權,民間表面上好像也佔到一個好的決策位置,可以去遊說某一些特定的政府高官,但是其實不一定能夠發揮效果。

Lee Gen-cheng: Most of the development projects in Taiwan are in the ‘environmental assessment’ stage. This process of assessing environmental impact has been in place for the past decade or so. But so far this has been more of a rubber stamp process, with the government just glossing over the assessment. When the new Environmental Protection Administration director (Chang Kuo-lung) took office in 2005, he invited some private environmental protection group members to join the assessment process. But pressure from the Executive Yuan ultimately forces environmental policy assessment direction. In Taiwan, the central government is still the authority that controls most development projects. On the surface, it appears as though private groups hold some sway, but when it comes time to canvas officials, results are not always forthcoming.

環保署裡有一個所謂「專業評估」的機制。1994年《環境影響評估法》通過後,規定開發規模在一定範圍以上的,就必須進行環境影響評估;山坡地的開發評估比較嚴格,一公頃以上就要做環評,平地比較寬鬆。工業區的設立、道路的開發、礦業的開採等,幾乎所有的開發案都要經過環境影響評估。在環評會裡,21個委員裡有7個市政府的副部長,就是跟開發案比較沒有直接關係的官員,例如經濟建設委員會、農業委員會等單位的副部長,加上十四位的專家學者進行審查。按台灣環評法的設計,如果開發案在環境評估階段被認定有重大的衝擊,是可以把它否決的。可是專業審查的制度否決權很少被動用,因為它挑戰到行政院的權力。行政院有時候決定一個開發案要做了,照理講,行政院長是比環保署大,可是這個案子送到環保署,居然被署裡面的一個環境影響評估委員會否決,行政院基本上是沒有辦法接受的,所以雖然他們明明知道法律給環評委員這樣的權力,他們還是設法透過種種層面來干預,讓環評的審查最後能夠符合行政院的意旨。

The EPA has a specialized mechanism for environmental assessment. After the ‘Environmental Impact Assessment Law’ was passed in 1994, it stipulated that any development project within certain scopes had to undergo assessment. Mountainside development assessments are particularly stringent, as any development plan over one hectare has to undergo the process; flatland assessments are less stringent. Almost all industrial zone setups, road developing and mining activity have to go through environmental impact assessment. There are twenty-one members taking part in environmental impact meetings; seven of these members are vice ministers that have no direct contact with the development project, such as officials with the Council for Economic Planning and Development and the Council of Agriculture. There are also fourteen experts and scholars who round out the committee. According to the design of the law, if it is determined during the assessment process that if a development project will have too big of an impact on the environment, it can be turned down. In point of fact, however, this veto power is seldom evoked as it encroaches on the authority of the Executive Yuan. Whenever the Executive Yuan decides to go through with a development project, it usually does, as in the end the premier has more power than the EPA director. If a case is vetoed by the EPA’s assessment committee, the Executive Yuan higher ups will often override the decision if they find it unacceptable. Even though they know quite well that the law gives the environmental impact assessment committee the power to veto projects, central government officials still think up ways to intervene in the process, making the committee capitulate to their interests in the end.

※ 本文轉載自Taiwan News Online